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C
rAbstract
Management through and by sectors has emerged as the primary mechanism for
managing the Multispecies Groundfish Fishery in the Northeast United States.
Sectors are cooperative associations of fishermen that in theory can pursue their
own community-based goals but that in practice have tended to operate more like
individual quotas. Based on interviews with groundfish sector managers, this paper
examines the emergence of sectors as a new institutional form in the Northeast,
and the rapid reorganization of the industry that has occurred in the wake of
sectors. Some sectors have depended on existing relationships, particularly in
sectors based on common ports, ethnicity, or kinship. But sectors also call on new sets of
relationships and roles, such as the role of sector managers as important new bridges or
“boundary agents” between government and industry. This paper reviews the differences
and commonalities in the goals and objectives of different sector groups, the challenges
and opportunities fishermen have faced adapting to the sector system in the context of
reduced allocations, as well as the changing importance of different institutional forms
in the management of the fishery. The sector system has been an experiment in
decentralized and collaborative management, but in a context of increasingly
privatized resources, rendering challenges and opportunities to fishermen in a
rapidly changing socio-ecological environment.
Keywords: Fisheries governance; Co-management; Northeast United States (US)
Multispecies Groundfish Fishery; Institutions; Social capitalIntroduction
The groundfish fishery—a complex of bottom-dwelling species including Atlantic cod,
haddock, yellowtail flounder, and Atlantic halibut—was one of the first colonial endeavors
in New England, and remains its iconic fishery. Despite the implementation of the first
Fishery Management Plan for groundfish in 1987, however, “most New England ground-
fish stocks have been heavily exploited and overfished for decades” (Brodziak et al. 2008:
358). The history of groundfish management in the Northeast US, which in addition to
sixteen implemented amendments includes fifty regulatory adjustments (called frame-
works) to the management plan, is also one of frequent industry opposition, resentment,
criticism, and actual lawsuits (see overview in Acheson 2011). Although the reasons for2014 Olson and Pinto da Silva; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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management regime per se, including inconsistent policies and incentives that encouraged
early fleet expansion (Acheson 1984), reliance on indirect controls, which ineffectively
limited fishing effort (Anthony 1990), and the need for better integration “of science, man-
agement, and harvesting” (Hennessey and Healey 2000: 210).
Groundfishermen are highly diverse, from size of operation to type of gear to choice of
fishing grounds. Such diversity would seem to reduce the likelihood of fishermen com-
ing together to form groups to manage their resources, as Ostrom’s (1990) well known
design elements would suggest and as some have specially argued for New England
groundfishermen (Acheson 2006). Yet robust elements of social capital, often defined
in terms of social networks, norms and relations of trust that enable cooperation and
collective action (e.g. Pretty and Ward 2001), have been found in the groundfish in-
dustry (Holland et al. 2010), while community-based processes such as cooperation
and mutual dependence have been found to characterize a diverse economy in fishing
communities in New England (St. Martin 2005, 2007). While elements of participatory
decision-making have been noted in previous regulatory actions of the groundfish in-
dustry (Hall-Arber 2005), since 2010 the allocation of the quota of New England
groundfish has occurred primarily through the use of sectors, cooperative associations
of fishermen (Figure 1). The use of sectors for the groundfish fishery was first pro-
posed and used by a local, community-based user group, but the general strategy soon
became part of a wider government promotion to consider “catch shares” as a manage-
ment tool more generally, a complicated transition that we detail in the next section.
Needless to say, this context of change and the possibility of further reductionsa in
fishing opportunities for fishermen created enormous challenges for fishermen seeking
to preserve their fishing businesses and livelihoods. As such, both the management
change with its ensuing need to create new structures and practices, coupled with con-
cern over how the allocation of quota would be determined, provoked significant con-
flict, concern, and expectations (Holland et al. 2013). For some, sectors were the lesser
of two evils. For others, they were a medium for more decentralized and community-
oriented management. And for still others, especially those struggling under low allo-
cations and those concerned about a consolidating industry, the management change
was despised.
But such forms of management also mark a more general emergence of hybrid institu-
tional forms of environmental governance that involve different kinds of actors across
spatial scales, such as private-public partnerships (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). As Bulkeley
(2005) has argued, such hybrid efforts have involved not only a “rescaling of environmen-
tal governance” but may also create “new spheres” of authority as well, in which the very
nature of activities undertaken may change. While the decentralization embodied by such
hybrid forms has sparked hope for greater democratization of decision-making, issues of
accountability and power imbalances mean that “contingent outcomes of contemporary
shifts in governance, therefore, depend crucially on the ways local actors mobilize and es-
tablish alliances across sociopolitical and administrative scales of governance” (Lemos and
Agrawal: 305). The sector system, though controversial, is a new direction in fisheries
management in this region not only because it changed from an effort-based to a catch-
based system, but because it represents an institutional change in governance that has ne-
cessitated such mobilizations and alliances. In the midst of crisis, fishermen have had to
Figure 1 Institutional map of groundfish management.
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tunity for fishermen to organize around issues and practices far broader than quota alloca-
tion per se. This paper, based primarily on interviews with sector managers, seeks to
explore some of the important dimensions of this institutional change: the background in
which it evolved; the context in which it is has functioned; and the expectations for future
management. In particular, we have sought to detail the processes that actors have had to
adopt or to make in order to facilitate communication and cooperation, and the formal
and informal relations and networks that have enabled them. Sector managers, as we ex-
plore in more detail in following sections, play an important new role as informal “bound-
ary agents” in this new regime: similar to those described by Cash et al. (2003) who enable
essential efforts at communication, translation and mediation; as well as Larner and
Craig’s (2005) notion of “strategic brokers” who mediate public-private partnerships and
foster new spaces of governance. In addition to issues like consolidation that have im-
pacted other similar experiments with sector management (see van Ginkel 2009 on the
Netherlands), these interviews with managers revealed the importance of trust, connec-
tions and relations; the historical persistence of management and the misfit between ex-
pectations and reality; and the changing roles of managers and fishermen themselves.
As Ostrom (2010) has written, current theoretical efforts to understand collective
action involve better understanding the role of trust. Indeed, past uses of social capital
elements like trust have been critiqued for a circularity of reasoning that does not spe-
cify how social capital actually engenders collective action (Harriss and de Renzio 1997;
Portes 1998; Ishihara and Pascual 2009). Moreover, Çalışkan and Callon (2010: 21) argue
that “trust” covers only a part of the “emotional, corporal, textual and technical elements
that contribute to the maintenance of markets” and “black-boxes” their actual operations.
As anthropologists and social scientists, we are keenly aware of how trust and other social
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and within groups. If adaptive governance depends on processes like trust that are built
up through networked interactions (Folke et al. 2005), then the historical, political and
sociocultural context of such collaborative learning is also key. Thus it is surely significant
that while ideas that fishermen may have about equity and fairness have mediated rela-
tions in many sectors, the development of sectors has occurred in a context in which there
are no clear goals for the groundfishing industry (Singer 2011: 67) and in which a preva-
lent fear among fishermen is that future access will depend on maintaining significant
catch histories (Brewer 2011). As initial observers noted (e.g. Holland and Wiersma 2010),
sectors represent the potential for a more collaborative form of management where differ-
ent sectors could be designed to achieve different goals and ways of distributing fishing ac-
cess. However, sectors, whatever their overall goals, have generally distributed allocations
to sector members as individual quotasb. Why sectors have not more fully benefited from
the collaborative aspects of management or embraced other ways of doing business—at
the same time that negative impacts have been considerable on some segments of the in-
dustry—raises acute questions for those interested in groundfish management in particular,
as well as for those interested in how other shifts in management, such ecosystem-based
management, may continue to devolve the scale of governance.
The research was part of a wider effort to document and understand the impact of catch
shares and sectors on fishermen and fishing families in the Northeast US (see, for
example, Clay and Colburn 2013). We are among a handful of social scientists in the
National Marine Fisheries Service(NMFS) c who are charged with, among other things, in-
vestigating the sociocultural and economic impacts from different regulatory measures.
The project detailed in this paper sought to understand the governance and organizational
differences between sectors, as they developed out of different backgrounds and histories.
Data collection included semi-structured interviews with sector managers, a permit bank
manager, and the program director of the Northeast Sector Service Network (NESSN).
Sector managers came from a variety of backgrounds, though most had previous profes-
sional experience or interest in the fishing industry. For example, one interviewee was a
former fisherman, another was a former observer on fishing vessels, and others came from
a variety of backgrounds in fisheries business, policy and research. All regular sector man-
agers were contacted, though not all were interviewed. A total of twelve managers in
charge of sixteen sectors were interviewed, covering 80 percent of the groundfish sectors.
Interviews began in the spring of 2011, and due to manager turnover, not all managers
interviewed are current managers. Most interviews lasted around one hour. Interviews
were generally recorded if permission was granted, then transcribed and initially coded
and analyzed using ATLAS-ti software for textual analysis. Topics of discussion included
sector background, governance and organization, and impacts on fishermen (see the ques-
tion guide in Appendix 1). Interviews and analysis were also informed by a review of
Council documents, letters, and newspaper articles.Building institutions for collaborative management
Sectors as a grassroots mobilization
Federal management of groundfish by the New England Fishery Management Council
(NEFMC, or the Council) began in 1986 with the passage of the Northeast Multispecies
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species found primarily in New England waters, not including a separate amendment
managing small-mesh multispecies. Until the passage of Amendment 13 in 2004, ground-
fish had been managed primarily through effort controls on allowable Days-at-Sea (DAS),
coupled with additional trip limits, area closures, mesh regulations, and so on. Amend-
ment 13 provided for the allocation of a percentage of the Atlantic cod quota to a fisher-
men’s organization, paving the way for the introduction of more such “sector allocations”
to be introduced in future amendments. The implementation of Amendment 16 in 2010
codified this new system of collaborative management into the management of groundfish
in the Northeast, representing a major shift in how groundfish is managed in the region.
In Amendment 16, fishermen were encouraged to form sectors, each of which would then
be assigned an “Annual Catch Entitlement” (ACE) based on the landings history (resulting
in a “Potential Sector Contribution", or PSC) associated with each sector member.
Groundfish permit holders who opted not to join any sector were allowed to remain in
the “common pool” where they would become subject to former regulatory controls such
as DAS. Amendment 16 saw the approval of 17 new sectors. There are currently 20 sec-
tors, two of which are permit banks and one that is a lease-only sector (see Figure 2). Most
active permit holders, i.e. those vessels with recorded landings indicating that they have
fished during the year, representing the vast majority of landings history, have joined a
sector. In 2011, 772 vessels with groundfish permits joined sectors. Of these 446 were
active and 301 landed at least one pound of groundfish during the year. The ACE of
the majority of the non-active vessels was moved to other vessels through internal sec-
tor transfers or leasing. Most groundfish vessel owners have one permitted vessel,
though some own multiple vessels, including fleets of more than ten vessels (Murphy
et al. 2012: 11, 78).
Most of the current sectors began through initial connections with more politically
oriented groups. The first sector, Georges Bank Hook Sector, was established in 2004
as a pilot case in Amendment 13 to the Groundfish Plan, through the efforts of the
Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen's Association (CCCHFA, but now known as
the Cape Cod Commercial Fishermen's Alliance) in Chatham, Massachusetts. The im-
petus to form this sector, equivalent to a harvest cooperative, came from an increasing
frustration felt by its fishermen with Days-at-Sea management restrictions. Hook Sector
organizers drew from research on and national and international examples of other co-
operatives and discussed the idea of forming the sector in association meetings for sev-
eral years. Their preference for a group quota system over individual ones was based on
recognition, as a spokesperson explained, that fishermen would have more voice at the table
if they came together as a group. The CCCHFA founded a second sector, the Georges Bank
Fixed Gear Sector, in 2008 (the two CCCHFA sectors merged in Amendment 16). While
the history of sector formation has been detailed elsewhere (Singer 2011), it is important
to note that the formation of sectors coincides with a broader trend of increasing
organizational capacity among fishermen. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and other groups—North Atlantic Marine Alliance, Downeast Groundfish Initiative,
CCCHFA, NSC and the Gulf of Maine Research Institution among othersd —came together
during the 1990s and early 2000s to support alternatives modes of management (Pinto da
Silva and Kitts 2006). As one manager put it, while members in his sector had known each
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formally testifies to their acknowledgement of the challenges facing their fishing operations
and heritage, and to the new importance of such connections.
The first sectors thus developed in part through community-based processes, but main-
streaming the concept required mobilizing a previously disorganized group of permit
holders. Taking sectors to a system-wide scale also presented challenges to the Northeast
Regional Office (NERO) and the Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC), who
quickly had to develop new reporting systems and associated databases (e.g. dockside and
at sea monitoring, sector weekly reports) and enact modifications to the existing systems
to accommodate new uses. The new sector system also required the creation of new con-
nections and relationships between fishermen and managers. For many sectors, this was
through the efforts of the Northeast Seafood Coalition, though other organizations also
came to play important organizational and financial roles. Twelve of the 20 current sec-
tors were organized by NSC (one is a lease-only sector)e. As NSC has noted (NEFMC
2012), it began to plan for sectors when there seemed to be no other viable options emer-
ging for groundfish management. NSC began to reach out to leaders in the fishing indus-
try, both NSC membership and non-members, identifying fishermen by geographic
region, fishing gear type, fishing area, vessel size, homeport and other commonalities, then
began organizing meetings, and eventually providing a template for sector organization.
As one sector manager described, one of the original leaders in his sector was a fisherman
respected by his peers, who knew and personally approached others about joining the sec-
tor so as to preserve the right to fish in his state. Many managers similarly noted the im-
portance of previously established relations that made fishermen comfortable doing
business together, and of key individuals who could effectively lay out options for
decision-making. Managers of non-NEF sectors also noted the importance of key NGOs,
philanthropic groups, and industry groups for financial and organizational support—such
as writing plans and by-laws, and helping with related programs.
Yet despite its grassroots beginnings in Amendment 13, many noted how the process be-
came more top down during Amendment 16, as sectors were soon perceived not as a
choice but as the only viable option. This was also found by Holland et al. (2010), where
46% of respondents felt that they were ‘forced’ into joining sectors and an additional 23%
felt that it was the only viable alternative available to them. At the same time there was a
push at a national level to create a catch shares policy to further their consideration in the
fisheries management processf. As a recent review of experience in community based nat-
ural resource management (CBNRM) has described, there is a common tendency for uni-
versal models to usurp local specificity and meaning, often with negative results (Dressler
et al. 2010). While many competing proposals were suggested by many different grassroots
groups during the early stages of Amendment 16, including area management, transferable
quotas, and so on, the council focused primarily on developing sectors when deadlines be-
came pressing, such that “Suddenly, there were industry groups that were supporting very
different approaches now gravitating to sectors as potentially the only opportunity for
meaningful change in Amendment 16” (Singer 2011: 35). Yet this diversity—differences in
goals and values that reflect “spaces of experimentation” (Healy 2009)—is to a certain de-
gree reflected in the different sectors now operating in the groundfish industry, an issue
which we address in the next section; we return to the issue of conflicting goals and objec-
tives in groundfish as a whole in later sections of the paper.
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Sectors share many features, shaped as they are by the exigencies of groundfish manage-
ment. In theory, each sector can tailor its internal design, catch distribution, goals, and
other features to reflect the particular values and interests of its members. In addition to
different goals and objectives, sectors can be shaped by the unique characteristics of their
participants and the existing or evolving relationships between these individuals. Most
sectors, as their original, full titles indicated, broadly share the same gear type and fishing
groups, but many have also coalesced around shared qualities such as ethnicity, port loca-
tion, or vision. Joint and several liability (in which all members are held liable if another
sector member exceeds the sector allocation) was also a factor in sector formation and
highlighted the importance of knowing and trusting the other members in one’s sector.
Style of fishing and vessel similarity were also important, in part because of discard rates,
as we discuss later. According to Holland et al. (2013), on average, fishermen knew 56% of
their sector’s members very well, but didn’t know 35% of their sector’s members at all.
The members of some sectors have very close relations: they may fish together, share a
similar heritage, and even be related by kinship or marriage. In others, members may have
known each other but not been particularly close, but sectors, as one manager put it, “pro-
vide an opportunity for fishermen to really know each another on a level they hadn’t ne-
cessarily before". While some permit holders had been in business with others in the past,
for most sector participants the new regulations represented major shifts in how they were
connected to each other.
Most sector managers stated the primary goal of their sector was to help fishermen
survive. Many sectors were brought together through the experience of similar prob-
lems, such as frustration with DAS, loss of fishing rights, or difficulties for small
owner-operators. This took different emphases, from better using their full allocation,
to sharing grounds more fairly, to improving profitability and “living within sustainable
limits". Sectors that were primarily family-run businesses were more likely to be con-
cerned about preserving fishing rights and fishing communities in their area. Many of
the port-based sectors were characterized as very cohesive but certainly not all, and
sectors not sharing a common geography could be cohesive if they shared something
important, such as knowing each other well enough to feel comfortable and committed
to working together or had a common and clear goal.
However, some sectors were formed by members who did not know each other, and
who came together more to avoid other sectors whose members they did not know or
trust or to avoid remaining in the common pool (Holland et al. 2013). One manager al-
luded to pressures some fishermen may have felt to join sectors in their primary port, and
another explained how some fishermen had sought specifically to avoid others with whom
they could not work easily. Some have found that through meetings (especially those re-
lated to Amendment 16) their personal networks have expanded to find more commonal-
ities with other fishermen: as one manager said, “it has become less about having
common gear type and more about common goals and mind-set". Yet those who do not
share or cannot build up social and other capital, struggle more. Though many sectors are
trying to make something out of a difficult situation, substantial concerns and challenges
remain, some of which are detailed in the final section. And despite the different goals
and objectives between sectors, all of the interviewed sectors return their member’s PSC
to them, effectively treating them as an individual allocation.
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Most sectors have a board of directors consisting of 3 to 9 officers elected by the sector
members. Sector managers are responsible for day-to-day business, and in some sectors
the board may also be strongly involved or consulted. Big decisions, such as electing the
board or letting in new members, are generally voted on during full membership meet-
ings, with one vote per owner, though at least one sector has weighted votes for some
matters. Most have an annual meeting of all members and some meet more often, from
several times a year to monthly, though attendance varies. In some sectors the boards
meet several times a year, others monthly. Well attended sectors appear to be politically
engaged, or heavily involved in groundfish (and perhaps also suffering more or with more
at stake). Some managers have experimented with web-based meetings but found add-
itional support necessary for such efforts to be effective. Learning how to communicate
has been an unexpected challenge in creating the sector system so quickly. Since sector
managers are an important boundary agent between fisheries managers and fishermen,
regular communication in both directions is critical. Managers had to learn how to best
communicate with their members, and solutions have varied between sectors. Some man-
agers rely on e-mail, though as one manager put it, that was initially “a logistical night-
mare” because not all members had or used e-mail. Others have found e-mail or texting
ineffective when “it’s still a phone driven business” and still others rely heavily on face-to-
face encounters. Both members and managers have had to adapt, through setting up new
communication means, learning how to use them, and finding the right mix to ensure
quick and reliable linkages.
Most mangers voiced satisfaction with the use of a board of directors and the way it
functions between the manager and the wider membership. Some sectors have specifically
striven to ensure their boards are representative of different groups in their sector, such as
different gear users or vessel sizes. Attention to structuring the board has been part of the
learning process. One manager noted problems of mistrust created when membership,
fearing consolidation, couldn’t trust the board members who represented primarily larger
operations; they have now made an effort to make the board more diverse. Another learn-
ing issue has been problems with attendance; sectors have expanded the number of indi-
viduals serving on their boards, as well as created alternates, to ensure enough for a
quorum. Some sectors also have other internal committees, such as an enforcement com-
mittee, and one sector uses a “citizen’s committee” of local non-fishermen residents who
are available to mediate disputes between members. A few sector managers said that com-
mittees or groups formed around issues of interest, such as research projects or upcoming
management issues, did arise spontaneously, and another noted that a number of members
had expressed interest to him in their sector doing so. However, as he put it, such issues
usually concerned “non sector items. People think that the sector encompasses everything
[…] but we only deal with allocated species and sector issues […] we don’t have the man-
power to do all that stuff". This represents one of many difficulties that sector managers
face taking on these boundary agent roles in a complex and challenging regulatory
environment.
Sectors thus display the potential for collaborative and decentralized management, but
they also face many challenges and need more support, as we discuss later. Many fisher-
men have stated their lack of trust in the fishery management Council system and in the
National Marine Fisheries Service, and have been little involved in management activities
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organize around their views, a need that newly forming interest groups within sectors
now express. Yet for many of the sectors with close ties to other organizations, especially
NEF sectors, the day to day work of managers and members tend to be operationally fo-
cused, not policy or vision focused, for the primary task for many managers is careful ac-
counting of ACE usage. This means that few managers have any relationship with the
Council. This re-routing of governance away from the New England Fishery Management
Council to the NMFS Northeast Regional Office represents a key shift in governance rela-
tionships in the region. For example, NSC (on whose board of directors may sit both
NSC-wide members and NEF sector board members) provides policy representation for
NEF sector members, while NESSN (incorporated in 2011 after organizational develop-
ment by NEF Sector and NSC leadership) provides technical support for its member sec-
tors by facilitating discussion between sectors, alerting NEF sector managers to important
issues (e.g. anti-trust), and providing a larger space within which NEF sectors can trade.
NEF sectors have right of first offer to lease fish and right of first refusal for the sale of fed-
eral limited access Northeast multispecies permits, which means that if a sector member
wants to sell either his fish or his permit outside the sector, the sector members are given
the opportunity to supersede that sale, in order to keep fish within their existing fishing
communities and/or the 12 sector network. The economies of scale created through this
network also extend beyond trading to include weekly reports and checking quota usage
and balance. This has been one major advantage of sectors forming within the NEF sector
network. The network has also provided a forum for negotiating and coalition-building
between NEF sectors on policy issues, extending in some cases to non-NEF sectors. One
sector manager outside the NEF sectors, however, called its double right of refusal (double
because the right of first refusal includes first the sector itself and then the 12 sectors in
the NEF network) “a real problem” because “they have locked up two-thirds of total fish
quota", making it harder for non-NEF sectors to lease fish; others saw it, however, as a
way of keeping their fishing communities viable.
Whether or not sectors rely on a parent organization for policy work, there are differ-
ences among sectors and sector members in the extent of engagement or interest in man-
agement in this broader sense. Some boards receive input from membership through
formal recommendations, consensus statements, or face-to-face interaction. In sectors
with low attendance at membership or board meetings, managers noted a number of
commonalities: members who didn’t fully know each other had little sense of community
cohesion, or sectors in which there was no unified vision. Indeed vision may be seen as a
luxury when many are simply trying to adjust and make ends meet. Some managers noted
a feeling among sector members that some of the larger organizations didn’t represent
many diverse interests in the industry, leading some fishermen to feel marginalized from
decision-making processes. Another factor for some sectors was that membership was
geographically spread out, or that its fishermen were primarily leasing groundfish rather
than actively fishing it; in both cases, there could be little interest in active participation or
policy representation. A number of sector managers noted the importance of key individ-
uals in the sector who can link the manager to other sector members; others, however,
noted problems if a sector becomes dominated by key individuals who don’t represent, or
reach out to, other members. Effectively identifying and resolving conflict or disagree-
ments was cited as crucial. Lack of leadership, insufficient outreach, or ineffective
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members in some relatively satisfied sectors were noted to have little interest in sector
decision-making just as in sectors marked by infighting. Dissatisfaction with sector man-
agers was also cited as a reason some fishermen move between sectors. And there is the
perennial problem that fishermen are out fishing and can’t go to meetings; as one manager
said: there are simply “too many issues and not enough time".
Key relations also exist between sector managers. As many explained, they tend to work
and trade with some managers more than others, in part due to needing particular fish
but also through relations they build over time. Some managers are also more active and
involved, and they may consult with each other about problems or questions, and, given a
level of trust, conduct such business as trades informally through verbal agreements.
Some felt that this collaboration might only be a temporary feature of the learning and ad-
justment period. Those who did not mention such camaraderie, on the other hand, lik-
ened their role to simply running their own business independently in that they felt little
need to consult or organize with other managers. Likewise, many have found that most
trading happens internally within their sector, with external trades channeled through
already established relations; others found it to be “just a marketplace” that is not based
on prior relations. Similarly, some leasing is arranged by fishermen in private deals, while
others rely on sector managers to mediate. Managers innovated by forming an e-mail sys-
tem to facilitate trading. Most noted their relations with the NERO, in contrast with the
Council, as being frequent and improving. This too has been a learning process and has
involved building relations over time, especially through monthly meetings. Communica-
tion with the NERO, sector managers noted, has improved as more personnel and ways to
interact have developed; as one manager put it, “interaction with the NERO was difficult
at first because so many infrastructural elements weren’t working…but I’ve never seen the
Service more helpful than they have been with sectors". Just as relations of trust had to be
built between sector managers and fishermen, face-to-face connections have been built
between managers and NMFS through repeated encounters, building trust but also some-
times distrust. Virtually all managers said they had excellent relations with those staff they
directly interacted, but more than a few also noted that “something happens after it has
gone beyond their offices". This bureaucratic element, as we discuss later, hinders reaching
fuller advantages from collaborative and decentralized management, with implications for
the ultimate effectiveness of sector management. Moreover, as Brewer (2011) has written,
the sector system may also decrease public accountability in that internal decision-making
and other functions are less transparent than public entities, and thus can undermine the
movement to co-management.Changing roles and opportunities
Some sector managers have taken advantage of the cooperative structure of sectors, and
the ensuing ability to organize themselves, to work on different policy issues. A number of
sectors have members involved in research and collaborative projects, such as gear tech-
nology and fuel efficiency, especially in conjunction with groups such as the Gulf of Maine
Research Institute (GMRI). One manager explained how their projects arose through joint
member meetings with Sea Grant and GMRI representatives, where they brainstormed re-
search ideas and voted on which ones to undertake. This stakeholder-driven research, he
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other sector manager noted, though some outside groups had hoped that managers would
be a liaison between fishermen and researchers, this has not always been possible given
their heavy workload, especially when sectors were new and many operational elements
were lacking. Others also mentioned legal issues that could prevent such projects, such as
insurance liabilities. Fishermen, too, another explained, may be interested in research but
suffer fatigue and frustration when their work is not used in policy or assessment.
Another development that a number of managers expressed interest in was in value-
added activities such as local markets and branding. As one manager put it, “sectors offer
flexibility to cater to local markets and understand when the vessels are landing to coord-
inate". Some were engaged in feasibility studies on local seafood demand and developing
the necessary infrastructure (such as local processing contacts or facilities) and communi-
cation media (such as websites to facilitate education and outreach with local consumers).
One sector had conducted a pilot Community Supported Fishery (CSF). Yet, for the most
part, local branding or marketing was happening by individual fishermen, not through
sectors. Again, one of the most important issues was the limited time, capacity, and capital
to undertake such new initiatives. The sector with a pilot CSF, for example, relied on an
outside NGO to run it. While managers were keenly aware such efforts could provide
greater financial return for their members, it would be risky for it would require learning
how to be a fish dealer, making the necessary business relations, and acquiring the neces-
sary licenses and capital investments in infrastructure. It would also be risky because such
efforts would require commitment from sector members, more difficult for small sectors
or less cohesive ones, and for those whose members might be inclined to lease their allo-
cation or who wished to retain more independence. Additionally, a number of managers
noted deep concern about anti-trust laws. One sector had anti-trust monopoly language
written into its operating agreement and was concerned that even individual fishermen
marketing their catch might be in violation of this agreement. Another manager noted
that without knowing more about anti-trust laws, his sector didn’t want to risk violations,
and even a report written by lawyer hired by the NSC and GMRI to provide guidance was
difficult to understand. Again, this speaks to the need for better meta-support from gov-
ernment agencies or other groups to better foster potentially innovative ways to sustain
sector members.
These elements of governance, within and between sectors, speak to the changing roles
of fishermen and their intermediaries. For fishermen, the voting structure within sectors
and the new positions of leadership in which increasing numbers serve, imply the poten-
tial for a greater voice in management. Some mangers also noted changing opinion of
some of their members regarding sector management, from skepticism to greater involve-
ment in its decision-making to even becoming community leaders. Most noted this was
out of a feeling of necessity rather than commitment to sectors per se; as one manager put
it, “individually they have no voice[…now] you speak united […] at least they are listening
to us". Yet another noted, with an example of monitoring marine mammal takes with the
sector’s own data, that sector members were realizing the benefits of being proactive, that
“they can take a little bit of control, as a sector, of their fate". Other managers noted how
independently-minded fishermen, even if they knew each other, might not have shared in-
formation or worked on shared issues to the same extent as they do now, which speaks to
how new institutional arrangements may engender changing identities and subjectivities
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liabilities has influenced who wanted to join which sectors, but at the same time it has
strained some existing relations, demanding self-policing and feelings of tattling that go
against deeply held values. One sector, for example, had to expel a member who had been
careless about his quota, but this action upset some and produced feelings of mistrust.
In all this, sector managers play a key role, effectively becoming the boundary agents be-
tween sector members and government, as well as between sector members and other
support organizations. Through managers, the fishing industry is working directly with
the NERO to manage most of groundfish, changing the role of the Council and, to a cer-
tain extent, decentralizing some aspects of management. Moving from nearly 1,500 separ-
ately permitted vessels to 16 individuals is a significant change in how information is
potentially shared, and feedback received, from industry. Managers have also had to find
ways to add value to their members allocation and to help pay for their operating costs to
ensure the long term sustainability of both their members and their sector. For some, this
has entailed creating permit banks and increasing membership. Others have also focused
on policy issues, such as working to create quota market restrictions to insure their mem-
bers aren’t disadvantaged. Managers and members are writing letters to the Council or
directly to its committees (such as the Statistical and Scientific Committee), to the NERO,
as well as to their congressmen, through understanding the science and taking a proactive
role in things before they become regulation. These are all further elements of co-
management that have been galvanized through the creation of networks and the linking
at different organizational levels (Rosen and Olsson 2013). Additionally, one manager be-
lieved that friction between different industry groups may be diminishing due to the role
played by managers, since they can interact on their behalf, both with other managers and
with government, but aren’t themselves direct stakeholders. Sector managers work for the
sectors and thus can bring sector issues to the various forums in which they participate.
Acting as representatives then allows for policy suggestions to be more organized and
more powerful, yet, as this same manager cautioned, it is still vital that fishermen be
brought to the table as well. There are many crucial challenges that fishermen, and man-
agers, continue to face, to which we now turn.Challenges
Many managers noted the initial challenges for everyone caused by the compressed time-
line for sector implementation: sudden changes (e.g. reporting, setting up trading), obtain-
ing PSC information, deciding which sector to join, technical difficulties, communication
problems, and troubles interpreting the new rules and regulations. Many of these chal-
lenges were detailed by sector managers in a Council-held “Lessons Learned” workshop
held in 2011g. As one manager noted, NMFS didn’t have the infrastructural support or
the “people power” in the beginning to support the new system; another described the
steep learning curve involved in becoming a sector manager. Most, however, noted the
good rapport and communication networks that developed with NERO staffers as they all
“stumbled their way through it” together. Yet many managers noted the frustration caused
by persistent infrastructural issues, most especially with data redundancies and quality is-
sues. While streamlining data processes was a priority identified at early workshops, one
manager felt data issues had only gotten worse. Another manager felt that sectors from
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other detailed the redundancy caused by poor NMFS data, requiring them to maintain
separate books and hire staff to manage the data. Instead of multiple reporting require-
ments (such as vessel trip reports, dockside reports, dealer reports), one manager sug-
gested finding ways to let sectors focus on their comparative advantage in getting
fisherman-based data, while removing some of the other reporting burdens that often just
repackage already existing NMFS data. Others suggested having NMFS focus on data
quality and data standards, while sectors could focus on data collection to which they
were better suited. On a related note, some managers noted that they filled out NMFS
data requests but were unsure of the purpose for these data, demonstrating the need for
better outreach and involvement. Finally, one manager said their biggest challenge was
“answering to two masters", with the agency increasing their workload and using them as
the liaison to sector members, when managers “work for the sector, not the agency".
The new system has posed many challenges for fishermen. Given that the sector sys-
tem started in a period of declining total allowable catches (TACs) and the introduction
of restrictive annual catch limits, many fishermen have had to deal with low and de-
creasing allocations. With the abundance of some stocks in the groundfish complex ex-
pected to remain low in the near future, these difficulties are likely to continue. While
sectors have many potential benefits, such as the ability to target a market or spread
out landings, according to sector managers many fishermen have not been in a position
to realize such benefits. Although some have argued that continued management
through DAS would have been more onerous, and indeed most managers believed their
members were also unhappy under the DAS system, nonetheless the low allocations
combined with transferability have had many predictable effects common when re-
sources become privatized (see Olson 2011). One of the most important is the issue of
consolidation (Kitts et al. 2011). As one manager described, some groups of fishermen
were better able to take advantage of the sector system: those with relatively larger and
more diverse allocations, and who had a stronger capitalized base, could more easily
buy fish from those with fewer options, driving consolidation. Many managers noted
that smaller vessels or operations in particular have had problems affording higher
prices and buying quota. Smaller vessels are also disadvantaged by the lack of any baseline
restriction on the leasing market, as in DAS leasing. This, as one manager stated, “doesn’t
recognize the difference in purchasing power and access to capital, [which] puts smaller
boats at a disadvantage". Moreover, many smaller vessels were also disadvantaged by allo-
cations based on catch history during 1996–2006, when measures such as trip limits and
rolling closures had greater effects on certain segments of the industry. There is a wide-
spread sentiment that allocations have favored the larger, more rapacious fishermen. As
van Ginkel (2009: 284) has written of the Dutch experiment with sectors, while many fish-
ermen have been pleased with the more participatory nature of management, it has come
with “considerable ecological and social costs”, including such concerns as highgrading of
catch and concentration of ownership.
The combination of an allocation too low to fish profitably and/or too little cash flow
to finance leasing creates a downward spiral, as decreasing profits increasingly cut away
at available funds. The response in the first year in particular was characterized by
managers as one of shock and of paralysis. But, as another explained, those who dared
to go fishing amidst the paralysis got better prices and did well. “If you don’t have the
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risky for those with less adequate finances, for there is no guarantee that leased fish
will be profitable or even caught. More than one could tell of fishermen who leased
high and landed when prices were low, going out of business. Leasing, as one man-
ager described, was “out of control” with prices too high for smaller operations to af-
ford. Managers noted the increasing stress and family problems that have resulted
from financial difficulties and worry over overfishing. Some fishermen have tried to
adapt by selling their vessels and then working for others. One manager noted how
impacts also extend beyond many of these smaller businesses, often family-run, who
have had to let go crew they have fished with for years. Another manager related
how some fishermen, out of a deep sense of personal responsibility, have tried to
keep their crews by leasing more, but with increased leasing costs still a negative fac-
tor on both owner and crew.
Yet it is not only small-vessel fishermen who have had to adapt. Fishermen who had
designed their businesses around DAS, for example, may have had to sell some vessels
at a loss to adapt to the sector system. Many voice worry about shouldering the costs
of at-sea monitoring and the continued uncertainty over who will pay. A fear of what
the future will bring, in terms of a changing policy environment as well as fluctuating
allocations, creates uncertainty and difficulty in making business decisions. As an-
other manager described, the new fishing regulations require a new way of thinking:
those who are able and willing to adapt and take a long-term view will benefit, but
those who don't will lose out; but as this manager continued, many fishermen are no
longer willing to adapt anymore. Conversely, some managers noted that the sector leasing
system has made it more profitable for some fishermen to treat their allocation as an “an-
nual annuity” rather than fish it. Though sector allocations are not officially individual
permanent allocations, more than one manager described the “ITQ-think” (for Individual
Transferable Quotas, or privatization of resources) that developed during Amendment 16
proceedings, in which some fishermen were encouraged to think about sectors as individ-
ual quotas. In contrast, the initial interest in sectors had been much broader and was
thought that individual sectors could tailor their allocations to their own goals and objec-
tives, such as profit-sharing (Holland and Wiersma 2010). Indeed one manager felt it
would cost less and be easier to manage community quotas than individual ones. But
others described how leasing itself encouraged thinking about sectors individually, since it
helps create a race to buy and sell before prices change, and encourages a sense of entitle-
ment to a particular allocationh.
The spatial distribution of fish and the mix of species within an allocation have also
been important. Day-boat fishermen, for example, with smaller vessels might receive
allocations for species that can’t target, whereas the price of species they do target can
easily be driven up by other fishermen to cover their bycatch. As one manager ex-
plained, one “driver of consolidation” is that larger vessels can afford to lose money on
secondary species, even when it’s not priced at its shadow value, but which they buy to
go fishing on their primary interests. It’s “quite dramatic how this has separated the
ability for these small vessels to participate in the quota market and compete with
these larger vessels”. As another manager said, “They’ve created this commodity mar-
ket for people who basically did nothing. It was never that type of market when it was
DAS…some people are reaping the benefit and some people are paying through the
Olson and Pinto da Silva Maritime Studies 2014, 13:3 Page 16 of 20
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/3nose”. Moreover, smaller vessels are more sensitive to finer scale issues such as local
depletion in their traditional fishing grounds; larger vessels can benefit more if and
when total abundance rises, whereas smaller ones need a fuller recovery of the stocks
in the local areas in which they fish. Indeed, as Acheson (2011: 70) has explicitly writ-
ten, from “the perspective of small boat operators in Maine”, the disappearance of the
option of area management from Amendment 16, such that fishermen can fish any-
where they want, “means that the large boat owners from southern New England have
been able to get the rules they wanted again”. Additionally, different fishermen (and
different sectors) may not fish groundfish exclusively, and the seasonality of different
fisheries may make following strict timelines for groundfish sectors more difficult. For
example, those who are done early in the season are disadvantaged by not knowing
how much quota they can carry over, whereas those who fish later in the fishing year
may scramble to catch their full quota. Many fishermen are also concerned about be-
ing locked out of fisheries when access is based on recent history; they can’t move into
them when different species are doing well and groundfish aren’t. Sector management
seems to amplify the effects of single-species management on fishermen, for as Brewer
(2011: 15) has written, fishermen must “negotiate for access to paper fish, suppressing
their own observations of fish life histories, spatial patterns, and inter-species and
habitat interactions” because “Many fear that not catching the maximum limit could
jeopardize future individual allocations because days-at-sea are based on catch histor-
ies, and individual quotas would likely be allocated similarly”.
As Berkes (2004) has argued, while “mutual learning” and “trust building” are both key to
adaptive co-management, they take time to develop and cannot be imposed. Managers pro-
vided many ideas about ways to improve the sector system, but more than one noted
how sectors are embedded in a large bureaucracy, i.e. NMFS and the Council, that
cannot collect or respond quickly to new information, so that the purported benefits
of the sector system are harder to materialize: “We have this sector system designed to
react to things happening on the water and it’s being hamstrung by a management and
monitoring system that is years behind”. Many noted with frustration that suggestions
on ways to improve or incorporate new information and studies were not acted upon.
A number of managers pointed to inequities from assumed discard rates, and sug-
gested better observer coverage to base discard rates on actual practices. Generic rules
neither encourage accountability nor reward stewardship, creating lost opportunities
to encourage collaborative management. An example that another manager provided
is hand gear, which has an assumed discard rate of 50%; this manager believes the pen-
alty assessed to that gear will eventually eliminate the gear from the Northeast, despite
studies showing high survivability of released juvenile fish. Others questioned the need
for any observers given the design of sectors to encourage joint liability. And one
pointed deeper to what he believed were flaws in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act, the primary legislation governing federal management
of fisheries in the US, and that a new commitment to participatory governance and
ecosystem-based management was needed, not micro-management of individual spe-
cies. One avenue was thought to be better capitalizing on bottom-up data that sectors
and fishermen could provide, as a first step in bringing stakeholders and scientists to-
gether. As this manager put it, “We can’t base this all on scarcity and fear; we have to
base it on abundance and hope”.
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The sector system was introduced to manage groundfish in the Northeast US with
many promised benefits. Yet in the first few years of sector management, as interviews
with sector managers have revealed, the accrual of these benefits has been uneven. Cer-
tainly, some groups are well on their way to capitalizing on value-added pursuits that
sector management is supposed to better enable. Others were overwhelmed and didn’t
know where to begin. Given the importance of formal and informal relations, those
with the least, in terms of both financial and social capital, seem to have fared the
worst. Yet many factors have been important, such as the amount of allocation, the
strength of support networks, and the need for business relations and acumen. Fisher-
men of different ages have faced differing challenges, with younger fishermen discour-
aged from entry and older fishermen concerned about being able to retire. Moreover,
sectors have had different levels of outside support and funding. Such asymmetries are
a barrier to the full realization of sector potential. It seems that many have assumed
that sector managers could be tasked to do things without full consideration for the
support they might need to be successful.
Yet sectors are also a new form of environmental governance in Northeast fisheries.
Both formal and informal relations and networks have been critical to creating new insti-
tutional forms of communication and cooperation, and in which the scope of manage-
ment activities has broadened. Sector managers as boundary agents have played a new
and crucial role in creating new alliances and networks of environmental governance in
the groundfish fishery. We have noted in this paper the need for further support and
greater flexibility to sectors and to sector managers. Yet success means different things to
different people. Sectors have been saddled with conflicting goals and objectives, with ex-
pectations to be both economically efficient vehicles of quota allocations, and institu-
tions to promote cooperative and devolved management. Given the expectation that
maintaining catch history is critical to resource access, it is not surprising that only
one of these expectations has gained the most ground.Endnotes
aThe implementation of this program was complicated by the assessment of overfish-
ing on most species in the groundfish complex, expected reductions in available quota,
and the further need by law to set annual catch limits (ACLs) and accountability mea-
sures (AMs) for fisheries subject to overfishing.
bWilson and Jacobsen (2013) have argued that the ability to communicate and to
reach resilient management solutions depends on not “reduc[ing] discussions of com-
plex systems to simple categories”, and suggest further that sector management in New
England may represent a flexible “boundary object” since the actual content of sector
organization is not imposed. However, the similar adoption by sectors to distribute
their allocation on an individual basis, despite no requirement to do so, speaks to how
the flexibility of a boundary object also depends on the context in which such commu-
nication occurs, a more general point to which we will return throughout the paper.
cThe National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), part of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), is the federal regulatory agency that oversees
fisheries management in US federal waters (the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone,
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gional science centers across the country that provide fisheries policy assessment and
advice, and which also participate in analyzing fishery management plans formulated
by the eight regional fishery management councils. In the Northeast US, this includes
the Northeast Regional Office (NERO), the Northeast Fisheries Science Center
(NEFSC) and the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC).
dSee organization websites, including: www.namanet.org, www.ccchfa.org, www.
northeastseafoodcoalition.org, www.penobscoteast.org, and www.gmri.org
eThese 12 sectors are referred to as Northeast Fishery sectors (NEF) II through XIII,
which are distinct non-profit 501(c)(6) organizations. Members of all NEF sectors are
represented by the NSC on policy matters concerning the groundfish fishery.
fSee http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/management/catch_shares/index.html (accessed 7
November, 2013).
gSee http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/cte_mtg_docs/111025-26_sector_ws/111025-26.
html for documents provided by all sector managers. Concerns expressed ranged from
the difficulties facing fishermen to data issues and communication problems, echoing
issues raised in the interviews we conducted.
hNOAA has been at pains to emphasize that sectors are not ITQs since they don’t rep-
resent a permanent allocation to a vessel (see for example http://www.nero.noaa.gov/sfd/
Amend16Docs/Reply%20to%20NB%20reply.as%20filed.3.2.11.pdf, accessed December 5,
2013). What is significant in this case is not only the concurrent efforts at a national level
to articulate a policy that promoted the consideration of catch shares more generally for
fisheries management, but the history of mistrust characterizing fishermen-federal interac-
tions in New England, which only intensified a desire to maintain one’s catch history
(see also Brewer 2011).
iNote: Landings include all species, not limited to groundfish. Permit bank location is
based on office location.
Appendix 1. Interview guide for semi-structured interviews
1. BackgroundHow was your sector formed?
How would you describe your membership?
Are there other groups that have been important for forming or running your
sector?
2. Governance
How are decisions made in this sector (e.g. one owner/one vote)?
What different roles or structures have you created for running your sector?
How are these decision-making and other activities working out for you?
Have there been key individuals instrumental in the organization of your sector?
Have your members expressed interest in taking on more decision-making in
the sector?
What are the particular goals of your sector?
Have there been particular problems you have encountered in trying to meet
your goals?
What solutions would you offer for these problems?
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Have there been, or does it look like there will be, any major changes in your
membership?
Are there members of your sector that have benefitted more than others from
being in a sector?
What do you think is the ideal composition of a sector?
What are the costs of sector membership? What services to members get from
sectors? Can everyone afford the costs?
4. Other
Does your sector interact with/trade quota/exchange information/cooperate in
some other way with other sectors? Which ones, and why?
Relationship with Council/Regional Office - is this changing over time?
Does your sector have any marketing activities?
Has your sector worked on creating ties between fishermen and consumers?
Has your sector worked on creating or changing ties between fishermen and
dealers or processors?
What other activities does your sector engage in?
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